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Abstract. This article gives a survey of combinatorial algorithms and
methods for database security related to the work of Mirka Miller. The
main contributions of Mirka Miller and coauthors to the security of sta-
tistical databases include the introduction of Static Audit Expert and
theorems determining time complexity of its combinatorial algorithms,
a polynomial time algorithm for deciding whether the maximum possi-
ble usability can be achieved in statistical database with a special class
of answerable statistics, NP-completeness of similar problems concern-
ing several other types of databases, sharp upper bounds on the number
of compromise-free queries in certain categories of statistical databases,
and analogous results on applications of Static Audit Expert for the
prevention of relative compromise.
Keywords: combinatorial algorithms, NP-completeness, privacy in data
mining, database security, time complexity, sharp upper bounds.
1 Introduction
This article surveys combinatorial algorithms and methods for maintaining the
security of statistical databases. We include concise statements of the main theo-
rems and results related to the work of Mirka Miller. For background information
and preliminaries, the readers are referred to [6], [17], [18], [42] and [48]. An ex-
cellent overview of various concepts used in statistical disclosure control with
detailed explanations and examples illustrating the major notions is given in [4].
Statistical databases are databases in which only statistical types of queries
are allowed. They store records with data on individuals (companies, organiza-
tions, etc) and can output statistics concerning subsets of individuals providing
aggregated information on groups of records in the database, while protect-
ing confidential data of individuals from disclosure. Users can pose statistical
queries, which are either answered (precisely or approximately), or rejected by
a control mechanism to ensure the privacy of confidential data of individuals.
Statistical databases are very important for numerous practical application. For
example, answers to statistical queries can help medical researchers to evaluate
the effectiveness of medications or certain lifestyle changes for the treatment or
prevention of various conditions.
It is usually possible to deduce confidential information by comparing the
results of several different queries. The security problem for statistical databases
is to develop control mechanisms that will prevent direct or indirect disclosure
of confidential data by the release of statistics as answers to statistical queries.
2 Classical compromise
If the value of a protected attribute of an individual record can be derived, then
the database is said to have been (positively) compromised. It is shown in [33]
how supplementary knowledge available from other sources can be exploited to
obtain values of a confidential attribute. The following types of supplementary
knowledge are defined in [33]. Supplementary knowledge of type I is knowledge of
the values of attributes which uniquely identify a particular record or a particular
subset of records in a database. Supplementary knowledge of type II is knowledge
of the value of a confidential attribute for a particular individual.
Let us denote the numerical attributes contained in a statistical database
by A0, A1, . . ., Am. Without loss of generality we may assume that the users
can submit queries on statistics concerning the attribute A0 and the values of
attributes A1, . . . , Am are used to select subsets of records for these queries. Then
A0 is called a quantitative attribute and A1, . . . , Am are called characteristic
attributes for such queries. The set of records chosen for a query by specifying
conditions on the characteristic attributes is called the query set. Denote by n the
number of records stored in the database. Let x1, x2, . . ., xn be the (protected)
values of the quantitative attribute in these records.
A SUM query is a sum of the form a1x1 + · · · + anxn, where ai = 1 if the
i-th record belongs to the query set, and ai = 0 otherwise. For SUM queries,
it is enough to consider 1-dimensional statistical databases, or databases with
only one quantitative attribute. An arbitrary set of SUM queries in a multi-
dimensional statistical database can be represented as a disjoint union of SUM
queries corresponding to different quantitative attributes, and each of these sub-
sets can be viewed as a set of SUM queries of the corresponding 1-dimensional
database. A set of SUM queries can be recorded as a system of linear equations
of the form
MX = V, (1)
where X = (x1, . . . , xn) and V is the vector with the values returned by the SUM
queries corresponding to the rows of the matrix M . Each query corresponds to
a row of the matrix M . It is enough to store only linearly independent queries in
the matrix M , since if several queries are known, then all their linear combina-
tions are known too. The standard elementary row and column operations used
to simplify systems of linear equations (1) result in a new system with rows cor-
responding to new queries with the outcomes equal to the corresponding values
in the column V again. Therefore, we can assume that (1) has been simplified
and stores a so-called normalized query basis matrix, so that M = Mk, where
Mk = (Ik|M ′k) (2)
and Ik is a (k×k) identity matrix. Then the matrix M is said to be in a normal-
ized form. The row vectors of Mk form a basis of the space of all queries with
outcomes which are known, since they all can be derived using linear combina-
tions of query vectors.
Audit Expert is a system using a normalized basis matrix to store all queries
answered so far (cf. [15]). When a new query is added, Audit Expert adds it to
the matrix and then reduces it to a normalized basis form again.
Theorem 1 ([15]). The time complexity of the combinatorial algorithm dy-
namically processing the query matrix of the Audit Expert and maintaining it
in a normalized form for a set of k consecutive queries is O(k2). The statistical
database is compromised if and only if the normalized query basis matrix Mk has
a row with exactly one nonzero entry.
The paper [38] suggested using a Static Audit Expert, where the query basis
matrix is fixed by the system (possibly the database administrator) in advance.
A user’s query is then allowed to be answered if it belongs to the vector space
spanned by the rows of the matrix.
Theorem 2 ([38]). The time complexity of the combinatorial algorithm for pro-
cessing each new query by a Static Audit Expert with a predesigned query matrix
in a normalized basis form is O(k).
This shows that Static Audit Expert is substantially more efficient than the
dynamic Audit Expert. The maximum number of answerable queries, for data-
bases where all SUM queries are posable, was determined in [35], where a com-
binatorial algorithm for constructing these sets of queries was also given.
Theorem 3 ([35]). (i) In a 1-dimensional database with n real entries, the





(ii) ([24]) The maximum is achieved if and only if the set of all entries is par-
titioned into two parts of size bn/2c and dn/2e, and each allowed query set has
equal numbers of elements from both parts.
The usability of a statistical database is defined as the ratio of the maximum
number of valid statistics that can be disclosed without a database compromise
to the total number of valid statistics in the database.
If a confidential statistic based on one record has been revealed, then the term
1-compromise is used. The problem of preventing a compromise (1-compromise)
can also be called the problem of preserving anonymity (1-anonymity).
Theorem 4 ([8, 23]). In a statistical database of size n where all statistics are






Theorem 5 ([11]). In a statistical database where all statistics are valid and
a fixed set of statistics are confidential and should not be disclosed, it is an












can be achieved in a statistical database where each statistic
is based on at most two records, or each record appears in at most two statistics.
It is an NP-complete problem to answer this question for statistical databases,
where each statistic is based on exactly four records or each record appears in at
most three statistics.
Range queries are a special case of SUM queries. A range query is a sum
of the form a1x1 + · · · + anxn, where x1, . . . , xn are values of the quantitative
attribute A0 in all records of the query set, and the query set is not arbitrary,
but is selected using a range defined by inequalities as follows. Let b1, . . . , bm
and c1, . . . , cm be real numbers such that b1 ≤ c1, . . ., bm ≤ cm. A query set of
a range query is a set of all records (r0, r1, . . . , rm) of the database such that
the following inequalities hold: b1 ≤ r1 ≤ c1, . . ., bm ≤ rm ≤ cm. The value of
the range query is the sum of the values of the quantitative attribute A0 in all
records in the query set.
The paper [9] presents several new results concerning the usability of sta-
tistical databases for general SUM, COUNT and MEAN queries as well as for
the corresponding range queries, and combinatorial algorithms for constructing
such sets of queries. In certain special cases the authors derive the usability of
m-dimensional statistical databases for all m ≥ 1.
The paper [3] is devoted to special sets of queries, where each record in a
database is contained in at most two queries. Sets of queries of this sort are
called queries of type α. For a set Q of queries, a graph G = G(Q) is associated
with Q. The vertices of G(Q) correspond to the queries in Q and edges of G(Q)
correspond to records of the database. The authors of [3] introduce the notion of
the L-core of the graph G. This concept makes it possible to formulate necessary
and sufficient conditions for the set Q to be compromise free. The paper [3] shows
how to determine the L-core from the eigenvalues of the graph, and proposes an
algorithm for computing the L-core directly from the graph.
Theorem 7 ([3]). Let Q be a query set of type α for a statistical database and
let G = G(Q) be the graph associated with Q. Then Q is compromise-free if and
only if G coincides with its L-core.
Several articles investigated range queries, where the values of the quanti-
tative attribute A0 are confidential and should not be compromised. For i =
1, . . . , k, denote by di the number of distinct values of the characteristic at-
tribute Ai in the database. The main result of the paper [27] shows that the
largest set of all range queries, which does not lead to a compromise, is uniquely
determined and coincides with the set of all range queries with an even number
of records.
Theorem 8 ([27]). Let D be a k-dimensional database of size d1 × · · · × dk.
Then the usability of D is equal to 1− 1
2k
∏k
i=1 f(di), where f(x) = (x+2)/(x+1)
for x even, f(x) = (x+ 1)/x for x odd.















In [5], a formula is given for the usability of range queries in a 1-dimensional
database that is allowed to contain many indistinguishable copies of some records.
3 Relative compromise
A new type of compromise, which does not involve the disclosure of exact val-
ues, was introduced in [37]. Namely, a set S of records in a statistical database
is said to be relatively compromised with respect to a field F if the relative
order of magnitude of the F -values of the records in S becomes known [37].
It is shown in [37] that even when the exact confidential information remains
protected, relative compromise may still be possible. Possible consequences of
relative compromise are studied too. By applying block designs for the design
of queries, it is shown in [37] that a relative compromise can be achieved even
if the overlap of any two query sets is restricted not to exceed one element. In
the case of SUM queries of fixed query size, the paper [37] used block designs to
derive a number of conditions for the relative compromise to occur.
Theorem 9 ([38]). Let D be a 1-dimensional database with n records, where
SUM queries are allowed, and let Mk be the normalized query basis matrix of
the Audit Expert. Then there is a relative compromise if and only if at least one
of the following conditions is satisfied.
(i) There exists a row of the normalized query basis matrix containing exactly
one nonzero element.
(ii) A row of the normalized query basis matrix contains exactly two nonzero
entries which sum to zero.
(iii) There exist two rows i 6= j of the normalized query basis matrix Mk =
(Ik|M ′k) such that the rows M ′i and M ′j are identical.
The paper [38] classifies various types of compromise and extends the mech-
anism of Audit Expert to exclude relative compromises for SUM queries. The
paper [36] used Audit Expert to determine the maximal number of answerable
SUM queries preventing a relative compromise.
Theorem 10 ([36]). Let D be a 1-dimensional database with n records, where
SUM queries are allowed. The maximum number of SUM queries preventing
relative compromised can be achieved by using a Static Audit Expert with the
normalized query basis matrix Mn−1 = (In−1|M ′n−1), where the transpose of
M ′n−1 is equal to
(−[n/2], . . . ,−3,−2, 1, 2, 3, . . . , [(n+ 1)/2]).
It follows from the results of [47] that the exact value of the maximum num-
ber of SUM queries in Theorem 10 coincides with the middle coefficient of the
polynomial
(1 + x)(1 + x2) · · · (1 + x[n/2])(1 + x)(1 + x2) · · · (1 + x[(n+1)/2])
if the order of the polynomial is even, and it coincides with both of the two
middle coefficients if the order of this polynomial is odd.
4 Group compromise or k-compromise
Statistics revealing information about a subset of k or fewer individuals may
also need to be protected, because supplementary information often allows an
attacker to derive private data about an individual from such statistics. The
disclosure of a statistic based on k or fewer records in the database is called a
k-compromise. The prevention of a k-compromise can also be called the preser-
vation of k-anonymity.
It was shown in [24] that the usability of k-compromise in a statistical
database with n records is in O(n−1−k/2). Denote by G(n, k) the maximum
number of SUM queries, which can prevent k-compromise in the 1-dimensional
database with n records. For any positive integers n and k, the next theorem
determines the value G(n, k) up to a constant factor less than 1/2.











































Further, denote by G(n,m, k) (resp., G(n,≤ m, k)) the maximum number of
SUM queries in the database, where each of the sums contains m (resp., at most
m) summands, and k-compromise is prevented.
Theorem 12 ([16]). Let m ≤ n be positive integers, and let t = bn/mc. Then
the following conditions are satisfied.
(i) If m n, then






(ii) If n→∞, then






Theorem 13 ([1]). Let k < m ≤ n be positive integers, and let
t ∈ {bn/mc, b(n+ 1)/mc}.
Then the following equality holds:






Furthermore, the optimal set of SUM queries involving k summands corresponds
to the set of (0, 1)-solutions of weight m to the linear equation
(m− 1)x1 + · · ·+ (m− 1)xt − xt+1 − · · · − xn = 0. (4)
If bn/mc = b(n + 1)/mc, then the optimal set of SUM queries is unique up
to permutation of the elements. If, however, bn/mc 6= b(n + 1)/mc, then there
exist precisely two (up to permutation of the elements) optimal sets of SUM
queries determined by the linear equation (4) corresponding to t = bn/mc or
t = b(n+ 1)/mc, respectively.
Corollary 1 ([1]). Let k < m be positive integers. If n→∞, then






Theorem 14 ([1]). Let k, m and n be positive integers satisfying one of the
following conditions:
(i) m ≥ 8, n ≥ m2,
(ii) 4 ≤ m ≤ 7 and n ≥ cm2 for a positive constant c,
and let t = bn/mc. Then the following equality holds:


















where t = bn/3c.
In [12] a new result is obtained for the problem of maximizing the number
of disclosed range queries preventing k-compromise, where k is odd, in the case
of a 1-dimensional statistical database.
Theorem 15 ([12]). Let D be a 1-dimensional database with n records, where
range queries are allowed, and let k = 2`− 1, where ` > 1 is a positive integer.
Then the maximum number of elements in a k-compromise free set of range
queries in D is equal to bn/2`c(bn/`c − bn/2`c).
The paper [13] determines the maximum number of sum totals that can be
disclosed without leading to a 2-compromise in a 1-dimensional database for
range queries. The following theorem was proved in [13] for a 1-dimensional
statistical database of size n, where n is odd, or n is even and is greater than 52.
For all other values of n, these formulas were proved in [32].
Theorem 16 ([13, 32]). Let D be a 1-dimensional database with n records,
where range queries are allowed. Then the maximum number µ2(n) of elements
in a 2-compromise free set of range queries in D is equal to
µ2(n) =
{
(n+ 1)2/16 for odd n ≥ 1;
n2/16 for even n 6= 12. (5)
The paper [45] uses graphs to represent trust levels in informational rela-
tions among entities for the purposes of treating the requirements of access to
confidential data for maintaining privacy and security.
The paper [44] introduces a Hippocratic security method for managing a
collection of statistical databases by a virtual community at several institutions
following a collection of management rules.
An attacker can often gain insight into confidential records stored in a statisti-
cal database using additional available information about the types of attributes
stored in the database (called working knowledge), general restrictions on the
values of the attributes in the real world (called supplementary knowledge), or
additional restrictions on the values of attributes caused by various legal systems
(called legal knowledge). The paper [39] proposed to use knowledge based sys-
tems capturing working knowledge, supplemental knowledge and legal knowledge
to regulate access to statistical databases for the prevention of compromise.
5 Generalizations and other related results
A new method for maintaining the integrity of data in publicly accessible data-
bases is developed in [26]. The method is based on the recent development of
pseudo-random function families and sibling intractable function families.
A practical method for maintaining anonymous and verifiable databases with
public data held in separate databases is introduced in [25]. It prevents unau-
thorized users from collecting and collating private data concerning individuals
from these separate databases. The method is based on the use of smartcards
and the improved Leighton-Micali protocol for the distribution of keys and can
be extended to mobile computing environments.
The security problems and possible mechanisms for the prevention of com-
promises are discussed in [34] with particular attention devoted to medical data-
bases, where confidentiality is paramount. The paper concludes with a proposal
for a security subsystem to be incorporated in a database management system.
Applications of value added networks in managing the security of information
stored in statistical databases in the health informatics sector are discussed in
[40, 41].
It is explained in [20] that the multidimensional matrix model of statisti-
cal databases and the multidimensional cubes of On-Line Analytical Processing
(OLAP) are essentially the same. The paper investigates the application of de-
cision trees to mining information from statistical databases and studies robust
noise addition methods to ensure the preservation of privacy. Methods for pre-
serving privacy and enabling k-means clustering are proposed in [31, 43].
A novel noise addition framework for a statistical database containing several
numerical attributes and a single categorical attribute is studied in [28]. Data
perturbation techniques for the prevention of disclosure of confidential values are
studied in [29] in order to handle categorical attributes without a natural order
of their values. A novel approach towards clustering of such categorical values is
proposed in [29] and is used to perturb data. It applies horizontal partitioning
and clusters the values of a given categorical attribute rather than the records
of the datasets. An experimental study was performed to compare the resulting
perturbation system DETECTIVE in its effectiveness with another system called
CACTUS [29].
Notice that k-anonymity is a broad concept applicable in various settings.
For example, in [14] it is studied for recommendation systems. It is shown in [19]
that permutation is the most essential principle underlying any anonymization of
microdata that involves the utility and privacy guarantees. Any anonymization
for microdata can be regarded as a permutation combined with the possible
addition of a small amount of noise. This lead to a new natural privacy model
called (d, v, f)-permuted privacy. It incorporates subject-verifiability, i.e., the
ability of every subject supplying original data to verify privacy.
The paper [46] explains how sum labellings of graphs can be used for rep-
resenting the access structure of a secret sharing scheme. Another privacy-
preserving framework using novel noise addition techniques is investigated in
[30]. It uses noise addition to categorical values as well, so that attributes of
all types are protected. An experimental study of the practical system VICUS
incorporating noise addition for categorical attributes is carried out in [22].
Statistical disclosure control is also discussed in [21], where a strategic depen-
dency model of a statistical data warehouse system is proposed and an associated
model of trust is explored.
The problem of evaluating and comparing privacy provided by various tech-
niques is tackled in [2], where a novel entropy based security measure is pro-
posed. It can be applied to any generalization, restriction or data modification
technique for preserving privacy of statistical databases. This measure is used
in [2] in an empirical study evaluating and comparing the methods of query
restriction, sampling and noise addition.
A new method for achieving k-anonymity of network graph data prior to
its release is considered in [7] for privacy protection. The method is based on
randomizing the location of the triangles in the graph. It is shown that this
new method preserves the main structural characteristics of the graph, which
can provide valuable information for the study of the graph, while preserving
k-anonymity.
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